College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2007

Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court" (2007). Faculty Publications. 346.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/346

Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

CONSTITUTIONAL A VOIDANCE AND THE
ROBERTS COURT
Neal Devins •
This essay will extend Phil Frickey's argument about the Warren
Court's constitutional avoidance to the Roberts Court. My concern is
whether the conditions which supported constitutional avoidance by the
Warren Court support constitutional avoidance by today's Court. For
reasons I will soon detail, the Roberts Court faces a far different Congress
than the Warren Court and, as such, need not make extensive use of
constitutional avoidance.
In Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), Phil Frickey argues that
the Warren Court avoided serious conflict with Congress in the late 1950s
by exercising subconstitutional avoidance. 1 In other words, the Court
sought to avoid congressional backlash by refraining from declaring statutes
unconstitutional. Instead, the Court sought to invalidate statutes or
congressional actions based on technicalities. If Congress disagreed with
the results reached by the Court, lawmakers could have taken legislative
action to remedy the problem. This practice allowed the Court to maintain
an opening through which it could backtrack and decide similar cases
differently without reversing a constitutional decision.

In understanding the relevance of Frickey's argument to today's
Court, it is useful to compare Court-Congress relations during the Warren
Court of the late 1950s to those during the final years of the Rehnquist
Court. From 1995-2002, the Rehnquist Court made extensive use of
constitutional law to strike down all or part of 31 federal statutes.
Additionally, the Court reinvigorated constitutional federalism. 2 This essay
will examine two questions. The first question is whether members of
Congress are serious about their independent responsibility to interpret the
• Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. These
comments are an extension and refinement of my spoken comments before the Legislation section at the
2006 AALS annual meeting. Thanks to Bernie Bell for organizing the section, Lisa Kloppenberg for
arranging for publication of section comments, and Phil Frickey for writing an article worth commenting
on. Thanks also to Matt Getty for helping me beat into shape a transcript of my spoken comments. And
thanks, finally, to the Minnesota Law Review for allowing me to make extensive use of my essay Should
the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1337 (2006), in the pages that follow.
1
PhilipP. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory,
and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 397,420-25 (2005).
2
See infra nn. 28-29. The reinvigoration of federalism waned in the final year or two of the Rehnquist
Court. See Linda Greenhouse, Foreword: The Third Rehnquist Court, in The Rehnquist Legacy xiii
(Craig M. Bradley ed., Cambridge U. Press 2006). Nevertheless, the Court's reinvigoration offederalism
was significant, as was Congress's non-reaction to that revival. See infra nn. 29-30 and accompanying
text.
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Constitution. One would expect that the more interested Congress is in
constitutional values and constitutional questions, the more willing the
Court would be to encourage dialogue between Congress and the Court.
Along those lines, the Supreme Court should make greater use of dialoguepromoting devices such as avoidance whenever it thinks that lawmakers are
sincerely interested in interpreting the Constitution. In particular, the use of
avoidance allows lawmakers to respond to a Court ruling without placing
Congress in the difficult position of confronting a constitutional ruling with
which it might disagree based on its independent interpretation.
The second question is whether the Supreme Court should fear
Congress. Specifically-Will Congress express its disapproval of unpopular
Court rulings by making use of jurisdiction-stripping or other court-curbing
devices? If so, the Court might be more likely to embrace avoidance rather
than constitutional rulings. Unlike a constitutional ruling, avoidance allows
Congress to express its disapproval of what the Court has done by rewriting
legislation. Correspondingly, it gives the Court an opportunity to ease
tensions with Congress by approving legislation, rather than forcing
Congress to attack the Court.
In the pages that follow, I will compare Court-Congress relations in

the early Warren Court era to those during the Rehnquist Court era.
Following this comparison, I will argue that the Roberts Court has no reason
to employ constitutional avoidance techniques. First, today's Congress is
not particularly interested in constitutional questions, so there is no good
governance reason to use constitutional avoidance. Second, though a whole
raft of court-stripping proposals has been introduced in the past few years,
the evidence suggests that today's Congress is not interested in striking back
at the Supreme Court in that way.

I.

THEWARREN COURT

In contrast to the modem Court, the early Warren Court had several
good reasons to employ avoidance techniques. First, Congress was very
interested in asserting its prerogatives as an independent interpreter of the
Constitution. Second, the Warren Court had reason to fear that Congress
was serious about court-stripping-so much so that taking a firmer position
would not have helped the Court accomplish its goals.

During the 1956-1957 term of the Warren Court, twelve cases were
decided involving Communists. The Court ruled against the government in
every case, though never on constitutional grounds. 3 Congress loudly
signaled its disapproval, coming, as Chief Justice Warren put it in his
memoirs, "dangerously close" to enacting legislation that would have

3

Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 90-99 (Belknap Press 2000).
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stripped the Court of appellate jurisdiction in five domestic security areas.4
The Court then relented and issued decisions that limited the scope of its
earlier rulings, essentially backing away from its earlier decisions in the face
of these proposals.5 As the New York Times put it in an editorial in 1960,
"what Senator Jenner," who was the sponsor of some of these bills, "was
unable to achieve in Congress, the Supreme Court has now virtually
achieved on its own. "6
The question is whether the Court was correct in using avoidance
and subsequently backing away in anticipation of a congressional backlash.
The answer is yes for two reasons. First, in the mid-to-late 1950s, the Court
could not assume tacit lawmaker support of judicial independence. The
prevailing wisdom at that time was that the Court in 193 7 had saved itself
from Court-packing by changing its doctrine-the so-called "switch in time
that saved nine. " 7 In other words, the Court could not calibrate its decisionmaking against the backdrop of a longstanding tradition of judicial
independence. Second, Court decision-making was truly upsetting to
significant factions within Congress. A very strong faction thought that
domestic security required anti-Communist, anti-subversive legislation. 8
Another faction strongly disapproved of the Brown9 decision. Most notably,
southern lawmakers embraced a manifesto, in which they pledged to use all
lawful means to bring about a reversal of Brown. 10 As Anthony Lewis put
it, the purpose of the Southern Manifesto "was to make defiance of the
Supreme Court and the Constitution socially acceptable in the South ... ." 11
Therefore, the Court had reason to fear that a coalition of southern
lawmakers and anti-Communist lawmakers would get together and would
have the power to go after the Court. 12 Third, a substantial number of
lawmakers thought the Court should give great weight to congressional

4

Earl Warren, The Memoirs ofEarl Warren 313 (Doubleday 1977). Indeed, Congress did narrow a 1957
ruling (Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957) (allowing an alleged Communist to have access to all
government documents touching the events and activities at issue in his trial)) by specifying that a
criminal defendant can only gain access to documents involving his own statements or the statements of
a witness called by the government to testify. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595
(1957) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000)). And while this may have only been a
"watered-down measure to modify slightly one evidentiary rule used in criminal trials," Barry Friedman,
"Things Forgotten" in the Debate over Judicia/Independence, 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 737, 752 (1998),
Congress nonetheless used this bill to signal its willingness to enact correcting legislation.
5
Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court 245-46 (U. Chi. Press 1962). Powe, supra n. 3, at 135-56.
6
Murphy, supra n. 5, at 245 (quoting A Regrettable Decision, 109 N.Y. Times 36 (Mar. 2, 1960)).
7
See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of
Roosevelt 154-56 (Oxford U. Press 1995).
8
See Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility 246-91 (Belknap
Press 1966).
9
Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 341 U.S. 483 (1954).
10
102 Cong. Rec. 4515-16 (1956).
11
Anthony Lewis, Portrait ofa Decade: The Second American Revolution 39 (Bantam 1964).
12
See Morgan, supra n. 8, at 270; Powe, supra n. 3, at 134.

342

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

interpretation of the Constitution. 13 In Donald Morgan's 1959 survey of
members of Congress, 40% said that courts should give controlling weight
to congressional interpretations of the Constitution. 14 For all these reasons,
the Warren Court had good reason to fear Congress.
II.

THE REHNQUIST COURT

Fast-forward to 2006 (when John Roberts became Chief Justice of
the United States). There are dramatic differences between the Rehnquistera Congress and earlier Congresses. These differences explain why
lawmakers today are less interested in constitutional questions and also have
incentives to launch rhetorical attacks against the courts. The defining
feature oftoday's Congress is political polarization along ideologicallines. 15
No longer are there liberal Rockefeller Republicans or conservative southern
Democrats. Before the 2006 elections, if a line of ideology had been drawn
in the House and Senate, all Republicans would have been to the right of all
Democrats. 16 This phenomenon is fueled by party primaries, in which
candidates in both the House and Senate must appeal to their respective base
when running for election. 17
It is also fueled in the House of
Representatives by redistricting, which typically guarantees safe seats for
Republicans or Democrats. 18
What are the consequences of this ideological polarization? One
consequence is greater cohesion within the parties and a sense that the
parties want to deliver a message that will resonate with their base. 19 This is

13

See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes Towards Constitutional Interpretation, in Congress
and the Constitution 39, 44 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., Duke U. Press 2005).
14
Id at 48 (extrapolating survey data found in Morgan, supra n. 8, at 365-83 ). Not surprisingly, southern
lawmakers disproportionately embraced this "independent constitutionalist" perspective. See id. at 45.
15
For more accounting of this phenomenon, see Neal Devins, The Academic Expert before Congress:
Observations and Lessons from Bill Van Alstyne's Testimony, 54 Duke L.J. 1525, 1526-27, 1534-45
(2005) [hereinafter Devins, The Academic Expert].
16
Before the 2006 elections, all but one of the Democrats were to the left of all Republicans. The one
exception was former Senator Zell Miller, a Democrat from Georgia, who was more conservative than a
handful of Republican senators. See Voteview.com, J08th House Rank Ordering, http://voteview.com/
houl08.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2005); Voteview.com, J08th Senate Rank Ordering,
http://voteview.com/senl08.htm (last updated Oct. 26, 2004). It is too early to tell whether and how the
2006 elections change the ideological balance in Congress. With that said, a key part of the Democratic
campaign to take over Congress was the party's enlistment of centrist candidates. Robin Toner & Kate
Zemike, For Incoming Democrats, Populism Trumps ideology, 156 N.Y. Times 1, (Nov. 12, 2006).
17
See Scott McLean, Man in the Middle, 155 N.Y. Times 15CT (Sept. 17, 2006) (recounting Senator
Lieberman's longtime struggles with his own party, which recently resulted in his primary defeat).
18
See Samuellssacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 415, 427-28 (2004); Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. Times Mag. 17 (June 12, 2005).
The 2006 Democratic takeover of the House demonstrates that redistricting, by itself, does not guarantee
victory for either party. Although most House seats are not competitive, some can be made competitive
when, for example, a sitting member of Congress is forced to give up his seat in the midst of a scandal.
19
See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in Congress
Reconsidered 217, 219-21 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed., CQ Press 2000)
(discussing the emergence of "message politics"). See also H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The
Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 Canst. Commentary 641, 692-93 (2004) (noting that political

2007]

CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE

343

so-called "message politics," where the Democrats and Republicans develop
distinctive, competing messages. There is also less interest in what happens
to legislation after it is enacted, including Supreme Court decisions
invalidating legislation. This stems from "position-taking legislation,"
where the focus is on making judgmental statements that are pleasing to the
base, instead of producing certain results for constituents. For example, by
enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act,20 lawmakers were able to take a
position in favor of protecting children, regardless of whether the Court
upheld the law. 21
Another consequence of message politics is that lawmakers are less
interested in independently interpreting the Constitution. There are several
indications of this loss of interest. First, there has been a clear decline in the
percentage of hearings raising significant constitutional issues. Outside of
the Judiciary Committees (which have strong incentives to continue holding
constitutional hearings) the number of hearings that raised significant
constitutional issues declined across the board between 1970 and 2000. 22
For example, the Foreign Affairs Committee, which used to have its own
expertise on constitutional questions, does not hold nearly as many
constitutional hearings as it once did. 23 Second, when Congress does hold
constitutional hearings, lawmakers increasingly look for witnesses who will
support the preexisting views of the party that selects them. 24 Of course,
hearings have never really been a bipartisan search for the truth. However,
some committees used to have unified staffs, and the hearings were less of
the staged press conferences that they are today. 25
A final consequence is that there has been a dramatic change in
lawmaker attitudes toward congressional interpretation of the Constitution
since Morgan conducted his study of the 1959 Congress. Bruce Peabody
tried to replicate the Morgan study by questioning members of Congress in
2000 using the same questionnaire that Morgan used. 26 This recent survey
occurred during the height of the Rehnquist Court federalism revival.
parties have the ability to expound their constitutional vision without needing to reach a concrete
decision, and that those parties are becoming increasingly cohesive and polarized).
20
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(b)(1), 104 Stat. 4845 (1991)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994) later repealed in 1995). The Act was overturned by U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and reenacted as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
21
Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51
Duke L.J. 477,513 (2001).
22
See Keith E. Whittington et al., The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971-2000, in The
Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 396 (Richard Bauman &
Tsvi Kahana eds., Cambridge U. Press 2006).
23 Id.
24
See Devins, The Academic Expert, supra n. 15, at 1542-44.
2
s Id. at 1543; see Roger H. Davidson & Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members 217 (lOth ed., CQ
Press 2006) ("Hearings, in brief, are often orchestrated as a form of political theater ... .").
26
Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry
into Legislative Attitudes, 1959-200I, 29 L. & Soc. Inquiry 127, 147 (2004).

344

[Vol. 32:2

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

Notwithstanding this revival, only 13.8% of lawmakers, as compared to
40% in the Morgan survey, thought that the Court should give controlling
weight to congressional interpretations of the Constitution. 27
Correspondingly, Peabody found that 71.3% of lawmakers thought that the
courts should give either limited or no weight to congressional assessments
of the constitutionality of legislation.28
Notably, the federalism revival did not prompt any meaningful
backlash in Congress. Federalism-related hearings did not increase in the
1990s as compared to other periods, and the federalism hearings that did
take place were not related to Court decisions. Rather, they were about the
Contract with America.29 The Court's federalism revival was of no interest
to Congress, at least with respect to hearings-there is virtually no mention
of the federalism decisions in the Congressional Record. 3 Congress, in
other words, was not interested in engaging in any kind of dialogue with the
Court on these issues.

°

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that today's lawmakers
see court-stripping proposals on socially-divisive issues as a way to speak to
their base. Like position-taking legislation, lawmakers are most interested
in launching rhetorical attacks against the Court. Moreover, because there is
some fear that median voters support judicial independence/ 1 social
conservatives do not want to risk a backlash against their agenda by pushing
for the enactment of such bills. 32 Indeed, they can reach out to their base by
introducing bills and making floor statements about them. Consider, for
example, the proposed legislation stripping the courts of jurisdiction on
same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance. 33 In 2004, the House
approved these measures shortly before the November elections, at a time
when the Senate never had an opportunity to consider them. 34 If Congress
had been truly interested in getting that legislation approved, those bills
would have been taken up earlier, and they would have made their way from
the House to the Senate or the Senate would have independently considered
ld
ld.
29
See Whittington eta!., supra n. 22.
30
See Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress
Crusade, 51 Duke L.J. 435,451-52 (2001).
31
See Gregory A Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court,
36 Am. J. Political Sci. 635,658 (1992). For a good overview of the judicial independence literature, see
Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2596, 2624-29 (2003)
(discussing, among others, Michael Klarman's work on how Warren Court decision-making on race
issues prompted a political backlash).
32
Neal Devins, Smoke, Not Fire, 65 Md. L. Rev. 197, 204 (2006) [hereinafter Devins, Smoke].
33
Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (July 29, 2004); Pledge Protection Act of
2004, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (Sept. 21, 2004).
34
Devins, Smoke, supra n. 32, at 202-03. The 2004 pattern held true in 2006. The Pledge Protection Act
o/2005, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (May 17, 2006) (as introduced), was not passed in the House until July,
and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee in August (again, too late for meaningful Senate
action).
27

28
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them. That did not happen. Instead, social conservatives in the House
wanted to send a message that would resonate with their base without risk of
political backlash.
Ill.

CONCLUSION: THE ROBERTS COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AVOIDANCE

What lessons should the Roberts Court glean from recent
congressional attacks against the Court and from the Warren era? Should
the Roberts Court make use of constitutional avoidance because it has a high
opinion of Congress-that is, it believes Congress cares about the
Constitution and wants to engage in meaningful constitutional dialogues?
Alternatively, should it make use of constitutional avoidance because it fears
that Congress is likely to strike back at constitutional rulings invalidating
federal statutes? The answer is no to both questions.
First, unlike Congress in the Warren era, today's Congress is less
engaged in constitutional matters and less interested in asserting its
prerogative to independently interpret the Constitution.35 Second, it does
not seem that Congress is poised to strike back at the Court. Unlike the
Warren Court rulings, Rehnquist Court rulings did not prompt the ire of
Congress. Recent court-stripping proposals, for example, have largely
focused on state36 and lower federal courf7 rulings rather than Supreme
Court decisions. This has been a distinguishing feature for most of these
proposals. And, as mentioned, the rulings in which the Court reinvigorated
federalism by striking down all or part of 31 statutes did not prompt any
significant response from Congress.
Lawmakers do not have incentives to strip the Court of jurisdiction
or otherwise engage in meaningful court-curbing practices. Though some
lawmakers are interested in scoring points with their constituents by
introducing anti-court legislation and making rhetorical statements about
activist judges, there is little risk of Congress waging battle with the courts
by enacting jurisdiction-stripping proposals. 38

35

There is no reason to think that the 2006 elections will change this practice. Such a change might take
place, of course, and if it does the Court will need to rethink whether it should reinvigorate constitutional
avoidance.
36
Perhaps most prominent among these were the Massachusetts gay marriage decision, Goodridge v.
Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), and the Terri Schiavo litigation. The Schiavo
litigation stretched on for years, with perhaps the most important decision coming in September of 2004
when the Florida Supreme Court struck down a law that gave Governor Bush the power to reinsert
Schiavo's feeding tube. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004).
37
These include the Ninth Circuit's invalidation of the Pledge of Allegiance, Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292
F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), and a district court order requiring Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore to
remove the Ten Commandments from the state Supreme Court rotunda. Glassroth v. Moore, 275 F.
Supp. 2d 1347, 1349 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
38
With the 2006 Democratic takeover of Congress, today's lawmakers are even more likely to embrace
the rhetoric of an "independent judiciary."
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What then of the Military Commission Act/9 which was Congress's
response to the Roberts Court's 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld!40
Not only did Congress authorize military commission trials of enemy
combatants, but lawmakers stripped the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction,
while allowing federal court review of both commission verdicts and the
determination of whether a detainee is an enemy combatant.41 This
legislation, for reasons I have detailed elsewhere, 42 was not intended to be a
rebuke to the Supreme Court. Lawmakers claimed to be following the
Court's direction that Congress sort out whether Guantanamo detainees
should be tried by military commissions or federal courts. Also, lawmakers
made clear that they were not stripping the courts of their authority to hear
habeas corpus claims grounded in the Constitution; instead, lawmakers
argued that enemy combatants do not possess constitutional habeas rights.43
Under this view, the only habeas protections afforded enemy combatants
are the ones that Congress granted them through legislation-something that
Congress could rescind. For this very reason, lawmakers made clear that the
Court could conclude that enemy combatants possess constitutional habeas
rights and thereby neuter the statute's prohibition of habeas filings. Bill
sponsor Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) put it this way: "It is a statutory
right of habeas that has been granted to enemy combatants. And if there is a
constitutional right of habeas corpus given to enemy combatants, that is a
totally different endeavor, and it would change in many ways what I have
said.'M
The Roberts Court, in other words, can make use of straightforward
statutory interpretation techniques to negate the habeas provision of postHamdan legislation.45 There is no need to invalidate the bill as an
unconstitutional restriction on court jurisdiction. More significant for
purposes of this essay, there would be no need to make explicit use of
39

Military Commission Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
41
For a summary of bill provisions, see Martin Kady II, CQ Weekly Online, Major Provisions of the
Agreement 2625, http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport 109-000002382864 (accessed January
19, 2007); Martin Kady II, CQ Weekly Online, Congress Clears Detainee Bill 2624-25,
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreportl09-000002382860 (accessed January 19, 2007); Karen
DeYoung, Court Told it Lacks Power in Detainee Cases, Wash. Post Al8 (Oct. 20, 2006); Scott Shane &
Adam Liptak, Shifting Power to a President, 156 N.Y. Times AI (Sept. 30, 2006).
42
See Neal Devins, Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed
Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 91 Minn. L. Rev._ (forthcoming
2007) (copy on file with Author) [hereinafter Devins, Congress].
43
See id.
44
152 Cong. Rec. S10267 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006). For additional discussion, see Devins, Congress,
supran. 42.
45
This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. In Hamdan, the Roberts Court
claimed that it need not employ constitutional avoidance techniques when interpreting a restriction on
federal court jurisdiction over enemy combatants. 126 S. Ct. at 2762-69. Specifically, the Court ruled
that traditional statutory interpretation principles suggested that the restriction did not preclude Supreme
Court review. /d. Consequently, the Court did not need to employ constitutional avoidance to steer clear
of deciding whether Congress could have prohibited Supreme Court review in Hamdan.
40
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constitutional avoidance techniques because of the Court's desire to avoid
the constitutional question as a reason to limit the statute's reach. The Court,
instead, can simply declare that the statute does not interfere with
constitutional habeas, including the Court's power to sort out whether the
Constitution provides habeas protections to enemy combatants. In this way,
the Roberts Court can use a statutory prohibition of habeas jurisdiction as an
occasion to assert its authority to define the Constitution's meaning.

